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1. Introduction 
In 2004 Europe will become a reality of 25 countries with the widest enlargement of its 
history, adding to its body 10 new countries: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Hungary. 
It will be the realization of the dream, a radical change of our history, that will realize the 
premise for a global idea, definitive of those that will be the boarders of Europe and the 
European reality of the future. With the enlargement the European Union will achieve an 
increase of the 20% of its population to forehead of a 5-6% income increase. It will represent 
therefore an effort, a political action, an investment in the economic dimension never seen 
before in the history. These countries will add to our community 25% more technicians, 
researchers, applied scientists, giving so the possibility to prepare the new scientific Europe of 
the human knowledge that is essential to build our future. Europe will open the way to the 
overcoming of the problems that the overwhelming greatness of the United States and the 
impetuousness of China and Asia represent, not in the protectionism or in the closing of the 
boarders, but in the development of that great resource represented by its great human 
resource and by its culture. 
An intergovernmental conference of the member countries has been constituted and is 
operating for completing a negotiation intended to reach a new Treaty, that will finally 
constitute a constitution for Europe. The text of the treaty is in advanced elaboration and 
object of a heated debate. 
The agreement of the E.U. countries on the future European constitution will represent a 
political action of fundamental importance and historical value. We will finally have a 
constitutional paper that will institute and join Europe for a future political design that will 
allow the development of a participative and democratic life of the Union for a long period 
and will allow also to burden itself with the great problems of the globalization as well and to 
face them with unitary constructive spirit and a new political idea that is worthwhile to all the 
member-countries and favors their life and activities. The stages of the run of the only process 
of coming to the approval and the following acknowledgements of the aforesaid constitution 
in the 25 Europe countries, when not yet wider, appear today complex and of a not easily 
predictable duration, not only for the known historical-political precedents of the member 
countries, but for the correlated deficits of a harmonic generalized and generalizable European 
culture, whose achievement will lead to a real articulation of the times of such stages. 
Culture pervades every form of knowledge and human activity, therefore, I have prepared 
this paper proposing to myself to limit my reflections to the aspects to which I am currently 
prevalently devoting my study pledge (the welfare state in the E.U.). 
2. Cultural meaning 
The history of the words and the meaning evolution of the concepts help us to understand 
how much the tools with which reality is observed and classified depend on the historical 
epoch and the social context in which they have been formulated and are tied therefore to the 
specific problems of which they represent an answer attempt. The same scientific concept of 
culture, whose roots are traceable in the new sensibility of the German thought of the end of 
the eighteenth century for the plurality and particularity of the forms of life of that time, 
assumes its history beginning, among the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, even if in 
different moments, various social sciences - from sociology to psychology - come into play. 
A new way is spread to look at the man and the society, with a more neutral look, more 
interested to describe the social reality as it is, than to prescribe as it should be and to reflect 
on the extreme customs’ variety of the social norms, of the traditions that characterize the 
human societies. 
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It is really the customs’ and life habits’ difference, particular and tied up to a specific 
place, which forms the new content of the notion of culture that dilates therefore its own 
boundary: from the cosmopolitan universalism of the scholars the humanistic cultural 
conception made reference to, to the enormous variety of the customs and of the local habits. 
Culture, is besides no more applied to the individual, but it pertains to a collectivity, neither it 
represents anymore a normative ideal, but its meaning becomes eminently descriptive 
(Bènèton 1975). The expansion of the boundary and the centrality assumed by the customs 
also represent the denial from the dawning social science of the professed culture universality 
and unity. It isn’t nevertheless, at least at the beginning of this run, the negation of the human 
race unity. Rather, the challenge launched by the social sciences consists of thinking the 
humanity unity through the cultures difference, or rather through acquired habits, instead 
through biologically determined «races». Anthropology is the social science that has tried to 
found its own disciplinary autonomy upon the culture concept, doing of this its own specific 
research object. It is owed to Edward Burnett Tylor, one of the founders of the anthropology 
as autonomous science, the first definition of the anthropological concept of the culture, here 
considered still as civilization synonym: “The culture or civilization, interpreted in its ample 
ethnographic sense, is the whole, that includes the knowledge, the beliefs, the art, the morals, 
the right, the custom and any other ability and habit acquired by the man” (Tylor, 1871). He 
felt the necessity to widen the application ambit of the culture term for being able not only to 
understand the modern science results or the Christian world beliefs, but also what could 
appear illogical from the point of view of the science or «not religious» from the point of view 
of the institutionalized Christianity. 
This first Tylor’s definition, of descriptive type, has influenced about half century the 
anthropological and sociological thought. In it you can enucleate the three main culture 
components and the three fundamental characters which were then retaken and as its own 
adopted by the emergent anthropological science in English and American ambits: 
a) what individuals think; b) what they do; c) the materials they produce;  
and more explicitly:  
a) the religion, the morals and the right or rather those norm collections and of explicit 
beliefs, elaborated in more or less formalized way at theoretical level. 
b) The customs and the habits acquired by the human being for living within a certain 
community. These represent the most innovative aspect of the new concept. There are, in fact, 
included in the culture also the ordinary actions that the individual carries out in the daily life, 
based on habitual and traditional rules, as the food preparing, as dressing up themselves, as 
using transport means, etc.  
c) The artwork, or rather the products objectified by the human work that are no more 
limited to the «work of art », but they include the cult objects and those of daily use or rather 
that «material culture» that in the Tylor’s definition is hardly delineated, but to which his 
successors did explicit reference.  
In this definition the three main characters that constitute the culture are clearly pointed 
out, above all. First of all the culture is learned, but not all the observable phenomena are of 
cultural type. There exist physical features, demands and behaviours of biological and 
therefore of innate type. The hair colour belongs for instance to the genetic code, the feeding 
demand and of finding a shelter to the weather inclemency is a biological need of all the 
existing populations on the earth face. Analyzing as this really happens, the formalities with 
which the human beings assume some physical features, how they feed and build their own 
shelters, there becomes aware however of their great variability. It will be enough to think 
about the great variety of the constructions invented by the men, beginning from the available 
materials, and from the more or less wide range of their choices. Everything is result of the 
learning and not of a genetically programmed reaction, belongs to the culture. With this we 
haven’t to conclude, that in the man everything is entirely the learning and culture product and 
that there aren’t therefore limits in the invention of always new forms of the human being. 
Also in the man the genetic base structure has an influence on the individual and collective 
behaviour, particularly regarding the emotions, and such structure sets some objective limits to 
the transformation possibilities of the human life. It stays however the fact that in the human 
being the genetic structure always interacts with the dimensions deriving from the culture. 
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The term culture introduces many different meanings. In subjective sense it can be 
considered in fact as “paideia”, or rather as formation process of the human personality 
through the learning: in this case, the man that is «cultured» defined, is who, assimilating 
knowledges and cultural values, has succeeded in translating the scholarship in personal 
qualities. Culture can also mean, in objective sense, the encyclopaedic patrimony of the 
knowledges that have been accumulated during the history of the humanity. In the way, I here 
refer, the term culture assumes instead a specific etno-anthropological meaning, directed to 
point out the whole knowledges, world images, beliefs, values, behaviour models (uses, 
juridical costumes, norms), institutions, art and technical products, etc. that in a certain 
historical moment, steers through the direct or indirect learning the experience and the 
behaviour of the individuals belonging to a same social unity (group, class, community, global 
society, etc.) (cfr. Kluckhohn and Kröber 1952; Red 1970). 
For a reasonable methodological distinction the concept of culture would have to be 
extended at least to the wide whole of the values involved in it. To define the culture is a very 
difficult assignment - culture is (as “politics” and “democracy”; Connolly, 1983) one of the 
concepts which are fundamentally object of confrontations. As they do, it invites to dispute as 
the contention belongs to their function. The concept treatments are reached through 
discussions on its uses in the several scientific disciplines (often neglecting the human 
sciences) or on some of its internal partitions (high/low, etc.). 
A possible definition is the following: culture = collectively held meaning  
It’s here necessary to specify what we want to intend with the term “meaning” in the social 
analysis. The following three points allow through a combined elaboration of them to explicit 
such definition of the culture:  
- values: things that actors evaluate, are they material or immaterial; 
- understandings: the interpretations given by the actors to the things; 
- the habits: the behaviour regularities routinely followed by the actors. 
Culture isn't properly reducible to the individual notions - even if such notions are 
meaningful for their holders, and common to many other holders. It is also anything as 
collective conventions that as bonds are perceived by those individuals. Such aspect would be 
subtended by the above indicated term “collectively held”- implicating such words, that the 
meanings have widely to be known (Bislev, 1997). 
When we apply cultural concepts to the social analysis, we are more often interested to the 
national cultures, in which the chances of the meanings consistence are not great in the whole 
“group” (Smelser, 1992). In such cases we have to do with meanings “collectively held”, to be 
intended only in the sense that they are dominant or very broadly shared or politically 
meaningful. 
The three concepts don't exhaust the possibilities to subdivide the wide culture or meaning 
concept. They are indicative towards the cultural analysis, and should introduce improvements 
on the usually under defined concept of the culture - often used as a catch-all or a not specified 
filler of the analytical discrepancies. 
3. The culture in the social ambit - the analysis methodology 
According to the common opinion, the political and economic factors are the main 
generators of every kind of social development; it is undeniable, for example, that the general 
level of economic wealth is decisive in determining the possible level of the social services. 
The balance of the political forces determines the current tendencies in the social expenditure. 
But the constant work of the economic and political developments on the welfare state filters 
through a multitude of institutions, generally making impossible to determine a direct cause-
effect relation among precisely defined political economy developments and welfare state 
changes. On the base of a more methodologically precise level it’s probably more correct to 
say, that the social sciences can’t imagine social developments not caused by political and 
economic factors. 
The whole scientific establishment within the social sciences founds its work on the 
analysis of the “political and economic” factors - to constantly add with more serious models 
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ideological and organizational factors (Hall, 1993; Mann, 1993). As appears every generation 
has to add other new ones; politics and economies remain central. 
The introduction of different factors from those political and economic has had different 
denominations, but the intention has always been of trying to understand the way with which 
the past behaviour and thought models influence the actual possible behaviour and thought 
ways - through models assimilable to the individual minds or to the binding nature of 
collective adjustments. It has been named path dependency, history, culture, ideology or 
institutions. What creates the great differences from country to country in its relative 
influence, is above all the way according to which the country is organized, and the way 
according to which its organizations are integrated in the institutional and general 
configuration of the state (Rokkan, 1970; Korpi 1983; Mann, 1993). 
The regimes of the welfare state represent anything similar to an inclusion of “other 
factors”. They are explications of history, of values systems and of ideologies - as the 
economic and power structures. The “other factor” is therefore better conceptualized as 
culture. 
Culture is undoubtedly an important factor in the developments of the welfare state: both, 
values, meanings and habits are important elements to determine the choices of the programs 
of the welfare state. If we initially accept a definition of the culture as consistent of the three 
below mentioned elements, we can line up a certain number of evidences to support this 
affirmation: 
Values – the good will to share the economic nation resources and the good will to pay for 
a great public sector are for the political actors essential attitudes, to be considered. As shown 
by the surveys of the respective positions, they broadly vary from nation to nation. Preferences 
are noticed in favour of the public against the private solutions, and also of the family against 
the individual responsibility and they hardly correlate with the welfare state types. 
Meanings - the understanding of the causes of the social need, meanings in partnership 
with words as “unemployment”, “responsibility” and with institutions as the state, the family 
and the trade unions; these meanings differ among the nations, and they are important parts of 
the dissertation in which the problems of the welfare state are debated and understood. 
Habits - the tendency to join together in collective organizations and to take part to the 
public life in political parties and in the elections, the traditions for the support inside and 
outside the families, to establish businesses, to employ and dismiss; such usual behaviour 
models determine the structure of the needs that emerge and have to be guaranteed from the 
welfare state. 
In analysing the culture there are more methods: behavioural methods or hermeneutic 
methods. The Parsonians approach aim to the methods of the behavioural analysis where the 
cultural factors are measured in terms of expressed attitudes or of acted behaviour. The 
alternative to the behavioural methods are the hermeneutic methods which aim to understand 
what actors are involved, to interpret the affirmations, the behaviour and the signals to draw 
the meanings in them expressed. 
An hypothetical example is the relation between Catholicism and residualism. A 
behavioural analysis would require the working out of some form of Catholicism index (the 
prevalence of the Catholic church, the churchgoers number, surveys of the faith declarations, 
behavioural faith indexes) - and a residualism index (high proportion of the means-of 
verification among the social benefits, low levels of the transfer incomes). Then the two 
indexes should be correlated, and the result would be assumed to demonstration of the causal 
relation: the cultures dominated by the Catholicism mind (or perhaps: they don't mind) to 
produce residualist characteristics in the welfare state. 
A hermeneutic analysis of the same relation would investigate on the dissertation around 
the welfare state policies, and would ask the participants about their motives and the causes of 
their actions. Which values were retained relevant by the participants, which meanings 
brought to the problems and which are the possible solutions, how could be seen in the process 
the role of the habit and of the tradition? Did the morality of the family, the subsidiarity, the 
respect for the authority, the faith in the divine providence, the society conception as a net of 
families play a role in the behaviour decision? The found answers would be used for 
producing a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of the process under investigation, and the 
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researcher would suggest an interpretation of the process in which to some factors would be 
granted more weight than to others. 
Both the forms of the cultural analysis reserve their problems. The “behavioural” produces 
results that are generalizable; if both the indexes of Catholicism and of the residualism vary 
together, then some type of general relation awaited as confirmation in several instances can 
be postulated with a certain plausibility. At the same time it represents however a small 
progress in relation to the common reasoning of the materialistic political economy: the 
cultural variables have to be abstracted to work in the behavioural analysis. There is causality, 
but generally as interpreted correlation, as causality through the theoretical reasoning, 
however it is far from being proven in the analysis. 
The “hermeneutic” form establishes the causality in a more satisfactory way – at the 
generality cost. If the participants express their behaviour motives and their perceptions of the 
choices in a way to sustain our hypothesis of a relation between X and Y, and the behavioural 
data don't contradict it, establishing any stronger notion than the causality in the field of 
human behaviour will not be possible. Parsons also, felt the need of an interpretation of the 
motives to complete the most structural data, to be sure that causality was really placed, 
including both the structural and motivational elements  (Parsons, 1951; Alexander and 
Seidman, 1990). But as the level of the feeling and the personal thought is brought to enter the 
picture, generality naturally disappears. 
To illustrate as the researchers cross this difficult choice, I’ve found the following two 
attempts of the methodological bridge crossing (Sven Bislev 1997). The first one, a brief paper 
of Katznelson (1988): postulating a lack of the analysis at the level of the social policy regime 
among macro - and long term at one hand and micro/short term on the other, works out an 
analysis of the concepts and the ideologies in the development of the United States welfare 
state - what he names the welfare state systems of values and beliefs. He works out therefore 
an order of very interesting distinctions in the analysis of the welfare state - different levels 
and precise statements of the distinction between citizenship and efficiency. It isn’t however 
founded on empirical material of the usual behavioural kind, - and cultural analysis remains on 
the level of meaning, of the intellectual analysis and theory. In this brief paper, the limitations 
are evident but the approach available to be contended, isn’t atypical for social scientists 
facing the cultural dimension. 
Analyzing in a less limited context, the relation among the Christian Democracy and the 
welfare state, Van Kersbergen (1995) combines with true success the behavioural empiricism 
with the analysis of the ideas. He analyzes the Christian Democracy that is the democratic 
political expression of the Catholicism - in a certain historical and social context. Using 
quantitative methods, he finds correlations among the position of the Christian Democracy and 
several characteristics in the political systems of some European welfare states. Having 
empirically established a model of “social capitalism”, he analyzes the ideology of the 
Christian Democracy and discusses the model of social capitalism that the C.D. tries to 
establish. He continues therefore to find separately the Catholic elements in the ideology of 
the C.D., and to discuss the intellectual roots of relevant distinguishing ideas. Concluding, he 
is able of showing both, the empirical evidence of the existence of a catholic welfare state 
model, and the ideation evidence of the values and meanings which nourish the model. The 
first part gives generalizable evidence of the models of the welfare state, the second 
establishes a logic and cultural motive. 
In the book of Van Kersbergen, the two methods are combined, by addressing the same 
historical object. Together they add evidence to his hypothesis on the existence of a specific 
model of Christian Democratic welfare state. Obviously the two methodologies are not fully 
integrated: there is no evidence that the intellectual ideas of the social Catholic tradition are 
active in the minds of the decision-makers builders of the institutions of the welfare state, or in 
the minds of the voting electors for the Christian Democratic parties. He intervenes in the 
sense to create a bridge on the methodological gap - but the gap persists: the separation among 
ceteris paribus and thick description remains. 
Conclusions 
The convergence of the welfare state almost constitutes presumably a bond by itself: the 
welfare state has a too much ample dimension to be considered only as a sector or a policy, 
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and it appears evident that the convergence of the welfare state is unthinkable without the 
convergence of the systems. 
An analysis on the cultural convergence - or one aspect of it has been shortly devoted by 
researchers of the European Values System Study Group (Ashford and Halman, 1994). They 
compared two opinion surveys since 1981 to 1990, collecting and working out a congruous 
number of opinions or attitude dimensions in 9 countries of the EU - and they found that 
“there is a light evidence to support the point of view that the Europe countries are moving 
towards the greatest consent of their perspective”. The existence of the new comparativism 
pointed out the disappearance of some forms of convergence of the thought: “In substance, 
from the nineties the idea that technology dictates only a unique optimal way to organize the 
production, pushing in this way all the countries towards common economic institutions and 
practices had clearly vanished from the scene” (Berger 1996, p. 4). And nowhere has been 
found evidence of the more ideologically favoured convergence idea of the fifties, according 
to which some social researchers believed or hoped that the first one and the second world 
could learn from each other. But in the eighties bloomed and still exist adverse opinions to the 
economic Berger orthodoxy, which reduces every social activity to examples of an 
omnipresent behavioural logic. 
The Tinbergen’s writings on the convergence (Tinbergen 1961) had “visibility” in the 
words of Heilbroner (1990), mentioned in Roland (1994): they expressed a vision of an 
important condition of the social affairs. Also the preceding and following debates on the 
convergence were inspired by a perspective of desirable social, however technocratic, 
developments. The recent economic orthodoxy, operating with ideas about optimal economic 
setups on the system level, escapes such visions; social negative collateral effects of rational 
economic policies are put aside apparently as inevitable costs of the evolution, sacrifices 
necessarily to be done. 
In this way, the convergence thinking is still reaffirmed, primarily in neglecting the 
institutional differences: it is assumed that a valid model and society theory generally exist, 
and that on the long time term there won’t be other possibility than to conform to it. The 
thought of the convergence of the modern economies goes over the theoretical orthodoxy, 
actively underestimating the negative effects of the market creation. This appears very clear in 
the situation of Eastern Europe. The social science had very little to offer for an understanding 
of the possibilities of oriental Europe after 1989, showing as the social science is dependent 
from determined institutional orders. This gave however a full speed to those theories that 
simply neglect the convergence problem, because they treat all the societies as instances of the 
same behavioural laws. Economics orthodox believes that Oriental Europe will follow a “J 
curve”: relevant countries will suffer before, their production will fall, then it will begin the 
growth and, having they capitalistic and mature economies, each will evolve through the 
mobility of goods and factors. “Ceteris Paribus”, it clearly means that, while the authorities 
attend the economic progress, a suffering load is being shouldered by a wide part of the 
present population. 
In the European Union, the economic standard theory also supposes, that each at the end 
will improve and specialize whatever is for him convenient. To neglect the institutional 
differences would mean to neglect the history: European States have developed very different 
societies and an integration process of removing “barriers” to the integration without raising 
the social protection, would introduce catastrophic risks of social misery and social 
disintegration (Scharpf, 1996). The societies that expose themselves to the international 
competition, also expose some of their social and cultural values to the undermining 
influences of the foreigners that otherwise act. A sort of protection or compensation is 
therefore necessary if the social disintegration has to be avoided (Dore, 1996). In the Eastern 
Europe transition and in the European integration the policy makers didn’t devote so much 
attention to the neocomparativists intuitions. Most part of the policies are done and introduced 
in the perspective of a unique best way or of general economic logic. The unique market and 
the monetary union are introduced as economic rationalities requiring precedence on all kinds 
of political and social instances. But arguments against the harmonization and integration 
rationality exist also in the economic theory, as: the free market will increase for some time 
only the wealth of some of the participants (Krugman, 1990; Streeten, 1996). According to an 
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innovative perspective, difference is positive for the development of new ideas  (Hingel, 
1993). 
The situation of the two Germanies represents a very interesting case of the relation 
between the social and cultural change. The social change has been there almost fully 
completed, and the legal regulations and living material standards have now become very 
close, or as close they could be politically realizable in the joint Germany. But cultures still 
differ, reflected in the different behaviours in the political field, different micro-economic 
behaviours and different attitudes have remained (example reported in the IUT of Oct. 28, 
1996: the westerners are tired to feed their brothers, and the Orientals miss of stability and of 
community). 
Other difficult situations have revealed themselves and will impose solutions and orders 
not deferrable for their incidence and actual virulence and they reside in the problem of 
immigration, - of the legitimating pretensions of invasions or religious pushiness and 
restorations of backwardness conditions in total contrast with the even culturally goals 
achieved and pursued in the EU countries in terms of laity of the government systems, and of 
the social and technological developments, - of establishment of an unitary international state 
subject to the rule of law - of assumption of an European unitary representativeness for the 
common defence of the peace and of the territorial and social safety and of the liberty and 
democracy in the member states against every terrorist manifestation or war aggression and 
unitary representativeness in the supranational organisms and alliances as the UN and NATO - 
of the common acknowledgement of the education methods and of the professional education 
titles in the 25 member countries. Less difficult situations but not negligible are also 
introduced today at national level by the federalistic pushes directed to the emersion of 
isolationist tendencies in contrast with the harmonization necessities for the union realization 
first inside and then outside our countries. 
The European Union Treaty expressly sustains: the cultural difference, the national social 
policy autonomy and the general policy subsidiarity, but it removes, at the same time, their 
institutional protection, in the way of a national state kept to national adjustments and 
sometimes enough powerful to protect them. In front of such barrier removal, will cultural 
difference persist? The welfare state can play as an example of such debate? These will 
probably remain open questions for several years while we will attend and survey the 
evolutions of E.U. enlargement, its Constitution approval and acknowledgement by the 
member countries and the following common agreement in the welfare state ambit. 
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